Florida Law Review
Volume 22

Issue 1

Article 10

June 1969

Federal Rules of Civl Procedure, Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims to
Meet the Jurisdictional Amount
James E. Aker

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James E. Aker, Federal Rules of Civl Procedure, Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims to Meet the Jurisdictional
Amount, 22 Fla. L. Rev. 154 (1969).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss1/10

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Aker: Federal Rules of Civl Procedure, Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims t
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

interrelationship with other problem areas. This is especially true of compulsory or permissive joinder. Whether the decision will prove to be a blessing
or a curse will depend greatly on its subsequent interpretation by the courts.
HOWARD

R.

MARSEE

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 23: AGGREGATION
OF CLAIMS TO MEET THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
Snyder v. Harris, 89 S. Ct. 1053 (1969)
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
of decision between the courts of appeals for the Eighth1 and Tenth Circuits.2
The common issue was whether separate and distinct claims presented by and
for claimants in class actions might be aggregated to meet the 10,000 dollar
"amount in controversy" requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction. 3
Shareholder Snyder brought a class action against a corporate board of directors alleging a sale of shares in excess of the fair market value designed to
obtain complete control of the company. Suit was brought in a federal district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Snyder alleged 8,740 dollars in damages for herself and approximately 1,200,000 dollars in damages
for others similarly situated. The district court held that the claims could
not be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount, and the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 4 Coburn brought a class action against Gas
Service Co. alleging the company had illegally collected a city franchise tax.
Diversity of citizenship was the basis for federal jurisdiction. Coburn alleged
personal damages of only eight dollars, but also alleged similar amounts for
each of 18,000 other customers. The district court held the claims could be
aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount, and the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit affirmed.5 The United States Supreme Court, Justice Black
writing for the majority, affirmed the holding of the Eighth Circuit, reversed
that of the Tenth Circuit, and HELD, amended rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure did not and could not change the traditional judicial
interpretation of "matter in controversy" that separate and distinct claims of
two or more plaintiffs may not be aggregated to satisfy the 10,000 dollar
jurisdictional requirement. Justices Fortas and Douglas dissenting.
I. Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1968).
2. Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968).
3. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1964).
4. Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1968) (following a similar Fifth Circuit
decision in Alvarez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 827 (1967).
5. Gas Service Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968).
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Exercising its constitutional power,6 Congress by the Judiciary Act of 17897
granted jurisdiction to the federal district courts in diversity of citizenship
cases. The sole purpose of this grant was to alleviate apprehension of prejudicial conduct on the part of state courts.8 Opposition to federal power is
credited as the main reason for limiting federal diversity jurisdiction to cases
where the matter in controversy exceeded 500 dollars.9 Congress has consistently increased this jurisdictional requirement, and it now stands at 10,000
dollars.' 0 The primary purpose of the most recent increase was to reduce the
workload of the district courts." A secondary congressional motive was to
avoid federal adjudication of issues normally calling for the application of
2
state law, and thus more appropriately tried in state courts.'
The Judiciary Act of 1789 did not define "matter in controversy," thus
leaving interpretation to the courts. The problem of aggregating the claims
of joined plaintiffs to meet the jurisdictional amount first presented itself in
1832. The Supreme Court held that such claims could not be aggregated if
they were several and distinct even though there was a question of law common to all plaintiffs. 1 3 The Court based its reasoning on the finding that
none of the plaintiffs had any interest in the claims of the others, nor could
any one of them be aggrieved by an adverse decree against the other plaintiffs. 14 In 1911, the Court held that each plaintiff in joinder cases must individually meet the jurisdictional amount if the claims were separate and
distinct, but if plaintiffs were seeking to enforce a single title or right in
which they had a common and undivided interest, claims could be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount.' 5 This became the general rule and
was considered settled doctrine by 1916.16
While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eliminated many of the restrictive provisions surrounding joinder of parties, 7 no change was made
with respect to the general aggregation doctrine developed by the Court.
The Federal Rules provided for a class action.' s This proceeding developed
6. U.S. Cozssr. art. III, §2.
7. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §11, 1 Stat. 78.
8. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); C. WRIGHT,
FEDERAL COURTS §23, at 64 (1963). For a discussion on the matter of prejudice and its
presence or absence, see Note, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 H~Av. L. REV.
483, 492-93 (1928).
9. Note, supra note 8, at 499.
10. 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1964). The jurisdictional amount requirement was increased to
$2,000 by the Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552; increased to $3,000 by the Act of
March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1091; increased to the present amount of $10,000 by the
act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415.
11. Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 5 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 Hearings].
12. Id.
13. Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832).
14. Id. at 146.
15. Troy Bank v. Whitehead, 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911).
16. Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 20; see F. JAMEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE §10.12, at 466 (1965).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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from a felt need to avoid the inherent difficulties of bringing before the court
all necessary and indispensable parties.19 Nonetheless, the aggregation doctrine
developed in earlier joinder cases was applied to plaintiffs in class actions.20
Rule 23 originally provided for class actions where it was impracticable to
bring all members of the class before the court, and the character of the
21
class rights were:
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of
a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting
the several rights and a common relief is sought.
' ' 22
Such actions were respectively dubbed "true," "hybrid," and "spurious.
These categories were attended by important consequences with respect to
the binding effect of judgments upon the members of the class as well as
aggregation of claims to meet the jurisdictional amount. A judgment in the
"true" class suit bound all members of the class regardless of whether named
and before the court.2 3 In "hybrid" class actions, however, judgments were
binding for all members only if the action was in rem as opposed to in
personam. 24 And in "spurious" class actions, judgments were binding upon
only those members of the class who were before the court.25 Aggregation of
the members' claims to meet the amount in controversy requirement was
permitted only in "true" class actions since claims in that category emanated
from joint or common rights, whereas "hybrid" and "spurious" actions pre26
sented claims several by definition.
After the 1940 decision of Hansber)y v. Lee, 27 which held that due process
permitted binding judgments on absent members of a class where procedure
adequately insured their protection, commentators became disenchanted with
rule 23 and its tripartite classification.2 Complaints stemmed from the ob-

19.

F. JAMES, supra note 17, §10.18, at 494.
E.g., Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442 (1942); Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95 (1939);
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a).
22. See 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE V1,23.08-.11 (2d ed. 1968); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS §72 (1963).
23. 3A J. MOORE,supra note 22, at 12.11 (2).
24. Id. at 1123.11 (4).
25. Id. at [23.11 (3); see, e.g., All Am. Airways, Inc. v. Eldred, 209 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.
1954). The "spurious" class action was in actuality nothing more than a permissive joinder.
Comment, Attacking the Party Problem, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 80, 93 (1965).
20.

26. 2 W.

BARRON &

A. HOLTmOFF,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§569 (Supp. 1968).

27. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
28. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 22, §72; Kalven 9:Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. RE-v. 684 (1941); Simeone, ProceduralProblems of Class
Suits, 60 MICH. L. REv. 905 (1962); VanDercreek, The "Is" and "Ought" of Class Actions
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scurity of such terms as "joint" and "common" rights or claims, and their
effect upon the binding nature of the judgment. 29 Application of the aggregation doctrine to class actions, however, was not considered an inherent
difficulty with rule 23.30
Rule 23 was completely rewritten in 1966. The amended rule sets out
more practicable guidelines for determining when class actions may be
maintained and provides for binding judgments upon all whom the courts
find to be class members regardless of whether the judgment is favorable
32
to the class. 31 It also describes measures to assure fair conduct of class actions.
It is readily apparent that the amended rule did not change the traditional
judicial interpretation of "matter in controversy." Nowhere does the amended
rule mention the aggregation doctrine, and examination of the advisory
s
committee's note reveals an absence of any intent to change it.3
The fact
that the judgment in a class action now binds all class members does not
support the inference that the Judicial Conference intended the aggregated
amount of the claims to be the amount in controversy. As the majority
opinion in the principal case pointed out, the aggregation doctrine predates
the original rule 23 or, for that matter, any federal rule of procedure.- The
Court further maintained that for two reasons it should not reexamine its
settled judicial interpretation of "matter in controversy." First, because Congress had consistently increased and reenacted the jurisdictional amount requirement, yet had remained silent on the matter of aggregation of plaintiffs' claims, the Court viewed the congressional silence as implied adoption
of the judicial interpretation. 35 The dissent stressed the hazards of this implication. It appears, however, that Congress would surely be adverse to
allowing additional cases before the federal courts when the latest jurisdictional amount requirement had as its main purpose reduction of the work36
load of federal courts.
Second, the Court found that overturning the aggregation doctrine would
transfer to the federal courts local problems totally dependent upon state
law, and more appropriately tried in the state courts. The Court also held
that the amended rule could not change the aggregation doctrine since that
would be an impermissible judicial expansion of jurisdiction contrary to the
mandate of rule 82: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts ...."3 While the mandate
Under FederalRule 23, 48 Iowa L. R~v. 273 (1963).
29. Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for United States District Courts,

39 F.R.D. 69, 98-99 (1966) (advisory committee note on rule 23).
30. Id.
31. FED. R. Cv. P. 23.
32. Id.
33. Proposed Amendments, note 29 supra.
34. 89 S. Ct. 1053, 1057 (1969). The aggregation doctrine was enunciated in 1832, but
the federal rules first became effective in 1938. Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143
(1832).
35. 89 S. Ct. 1053, 1058 (1969).
36. 1957 Hearings,supra note 11.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
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of rule 82 is firmly established, 38 the Court can, in making and construing procedural rules, nonetheless affect the occasions upon which jurisdiction is
exercised as long as the jurisdiction does not conflict with statutory law.3 9
Also, the majority opinion overlooks the fact that amendments to the rules
40
are approved by Congress.
The vigorous dissent by Justice Fortas, joined by Justice Douglas, charged
the majority with a stubborn refusal to conform judge-made law to the
reform sought by the amended rule. 41 The dissenters found the unworkable
distinctions of joint, common, and several rights or claims reestablished contrary to the purpose of the amendment. 4- They also saw a defeat of the
intent to give district courts wider discretion in the type of actions that
might be tried as class actions.43 The dissent further found the majority
guilty of violating rule 82 by construing a federal rule to limit the jurisdiction of the district courts, 44 and argued that it was just as likely that congressional reenactment of the jurisdictional amount requirement signified
an intent for the Court to continue to develop the interpretation of matter in
controversy as it signified adoption of present and past interpretations. 4 5
Since amended rule 23 makes no reference to aggregation of class members'
claims to meet the jurisdictional requirement, the principal decision is not
startling. The amended rule might make it convenient to treat the aggregated
amount as the amount in controversy46 because all members of the class are
bound. This, however, would go beyond the plain meaning of the amended
rule's wording. If the Judicial Conference intended to permit aggregation
of distinct claims, as the dissent argues, why did the conference not expressly
provide for the same in the new rule?
A better case could be made for aggregation if it could be shown that
nonaggregation will work a hardship on class suits. But such is not the case.
The principal litigants have only been denied federal jurisdiction, and they
may still seek their remedy in the state courts. Snyder has already filed suit in
47
Most, if
the Missouri state court and Coburn may do likewise in Kansas.

38. See, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941); Venner v. Great N. Ry.,
209 U.S. 24, 35 (1908); Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1944).
39. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946); Venner v.
Great N. Ry., 209 U.S. 24, 35 (1908); Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973 (2d
Cir. 1944); Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts,
33 F.R.D. 27, 28 (1964); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 399-400 (1967).
40. Kellman v. Stoltz, I F.R.D. 726, 729 (N.D. Iowa 1941).
41. 89 S. Ct. 1053, 1059-60 (1969) (Fortas & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1060.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1067.
45. Id. at 1063.
46. 2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 26, §461, n.15.1 (this was the only
authority cited by the appellant in the instant case).
47. 89 S. Ct. 1053, 1059 (1969).
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